Various Moral Souls in the West’s Breast
The West as a Contemporary Entity (Excerpts from "We and the West" – 9/11)
What is “the West”? And how do we relate to it? Over the coming weeks, I will be pre-publishing excerpts from my book Wir und der Westen (und die Welt), ahead of the full English edition’s release under the title We and the West (and the World) later this year. The full list of excerpts is at the end of this post.
“The ethical contribution of the modern West in the history of humanity consists in the emphasis on liberal and democratic values.” A statement like this, or a similar formulation, describes the moral creed of the contemporary West. It posits that freedom and democracy were born from a focus on reason, individualism, and secularity during the Age of Enlightenment and have been developed further from the medieval Christian and ancient Greek traditions.
Yet the West has also always contained oligarchy and empire, hereditary aristocratic traditions, monarchy, and dictatorship. Contending moral souls have resided in the breast of Western civilization. Even if today, on the level of rhetoric, hardly anyone questions freedom and democracy, the conceptions and interpretations of what this actually means diverge widely. Moreover, it is by no means beyond all doubt that the West can assert an exclusive claim to the development and institutionalization of the democratic ideal.
I began by acknowledging the sheer diversity of the West and the inherently immense challenge of comprehending it in its entirety. Beyond this difficulty of scope and lack of uniformity of the West itself lies the more fundamental challenge of speaking about the world as such. To do so necessarily requires us to take a stand, whether implicitly or explicitly, on basic philosophical questions, including what the world consists of and how we can acquire knowledge of it.
When we turn to the social, political, and moral realms, we must also confront a point made earlier, namely that it is impossible to avoid referring to values. Consequently, one is inevitably forced to adopt a political-moral standpoint. Is societal harmony the highest value, or the freedom and rights of the individual? How are the two intertwined, and how should they potentially be weighed against one another?
In the previous discussion on global order, for example, the assumption was smuggled in that a better and fairer world order is both possible and desirable. As is usually the case, it is possible to disagree with this assumption. One can argue that it is either not possible, or indeed not even desirable. One can be a cynic and claim, for instance, that the world of humans operates according to the law of the strongest, that weaker tribes, countries, or civilizations perish while the stronger ones prevail, and that there is nothing to be done about it.
To contradict this cynical view, one has to presuppose morality and postulate that more moral – morally better – conditions than the “law of the jungle” of social Darwinism are both possible and desirable. It seems to me that the West, as the hegemonic power, indeed bears a special moral responsibility for the global order. Furthermore, if the West takes its professed values seriously in the slightest way, it cannot be indifferent to the fate of all people and civilizations.
At the same time, the West must resist the temptation to consider itself universal where this is not justified. How outrageous the idea seems today of setting out to convert peoples around the world with Bible and cannon. The West, therefore, should not move from a flawed moral posture to a cynical, amoral one, but rather find an appropriate and non-proselytizing stance. It can and should make moral demands, particularly upon itself, and must neither succumb to cynicism nor behave nihilistically. To do so, it can draw upon ideas both from its own tradition and from various others.
Various traditions have indeed taken the step of not automatically accepting that which is as that which ought to be, in other words as what is right. Something that has always been a certain way may be a time-honored, beneficial, and appropriate custom. But it could just as easily have become a custom for less admirable reasons, and perhaps deserves to be abolished and rethought. Similarly, even if we assume that “man is a wolf to man” (homo homini lupus), meaning that the “law of the jungle” prevails at a given point in time, this does not necessarily mean that it must always be so.
Even if for many decades or centuries the law of the strongest – in the context of great power realpolitik – may have held sway, it does not necessarily follow that a hegemon in a moment of unipolar primacy must continue to behave according to these “laws”. Perhaps it could be different. And perhaps it should be different. Peace instead of war, cooperation instead of conflict, a logic of mutual gain instead of a zero-sum game.
In the realm of geopolitics and the relations between people and nations, one should at least attempt to find morally and politically sound conditions and arrangements, rather than those that maximize suffering, violence, and hatred. What this consists of precisely must be discovered, and so too must the method for discovering it. For now, the UN Charter and international law seem a solid, well-anchored, and accepted starting point. If even the West – that is, its imperial components – were to abide by them, much would already be gained.
I want to propose a theory here according to which a specific ethical configuration has emerged in the West, one that could explain a part of the contemporary malaise. To elaborate this theory, a few introductory reflections seem necessary and an added comparative civilizational framing desirable. My theory is hardly entirely new, but I would not know something like it has been presented in a similar fashion. To preview the core assertion, the thesis is that the contemporary West suffers from a lack of “positive normative conceptions”, while “negative normative conceptions” have gained the upper hand. From this situation, it is currently not easy to see what we as a civilization can, and should, rely upon, since a “positive normative conception” is likely needed in the long run, yet we currently lack a convincing and consensual one.
Among the Greeks, to whom our concept of ethics traces back, as well as in China (and indeed in the Indian, Islamic, Hebrew, as well as in African traditions), philosophical views emerged that articulated normative ethical conceptions – that is, views regarding what is to be considered ethically mandatory, recommended, permissible, or forbidden. Visions arose of the good life, of virtuous character, of right action, and of a just and good society. The precise meaning of the “good” and the “right” – the ethically good and right – and the question of what constitutes the highest moral value or values in any context, have been, and remain, the subject of profound reflection.
In the Chinese tradition, Confucius is regarded as the one who formulated this step towards an explicit ethical ideal. The term Junzi (君子, approximately “exemplary person”) had originally denoted a man of noble birth, a meaning rooted solely in social status. In the hands of Confucius, however, the term took on a moral dimension. He emphasized the virtuous qualities one should cultivate to become an exemplary person, a Junzi.
In our own tradition, the word and concept of “ethics” stems from the ancient Greek term ἠθική (ethikē), which itself is derived from ἦθος (êthos), meaning approximately “custom,” “habit,” “character,” or “disposition.” It referred to the habitual way of life or behavior that shaped a person’s character. Ethics was therefore, in essence, originally concerned with the cultivation of character and the inquiry into customs and habits.
However, particularly through the work of philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the focus of ethics gradually shifted over time from the mere description of customs to their questioning and evaluative assessment. Ethics thus transformed from a descriptive into a “normative” field, that is to say it was no longer merely about describing and cataloging human character, life, and actions, but about evaluating them. It became concerned with making prescriptive judgments about how people ought to behave and what virtues they should possess in order to have a good character and lead a good life.
Interestingly, we find ethical views in both Confucius and Aristotle that I would like to call “positive normative conceptions”. By this I mean those among the aforementioned “perspectives on what is to be seen as ethically obligatory, recommended, permissible, or forbidden” that are “positive” in the sense that they provide more or less clear prescriptions for what constitutes the “good”, the ethically good.
The exemplary person according to Confucius embodies, above all, humaneness (仁 ren), the ability and virtue of feeling and practicing love and compassion toward others. Junzi also adhere to ritual propriety (礼 li), the social norms of appropriate and respectful behavior, thereby contributing to the maintenance of social harmony and order. Furthermore, they practice righteousness and justice (義 yi), striving to do what is right. They also pursue wisdom and insight (智 zhi) in order to make correct decisions and distinguish true from false; they are sincere and trustworthy (信 xin), and demonstrate loyalty and faithfulness (忠 zhong) to the community as a whole and especially to those in higher social positions. Finally, they show filial piety (孝 xiao), a reverent and dutiful respect, toward their own parents and ancestors.
With these characteristics, the exemplary person follows the “Way of Virtue” and contributes to the ideal of social harmony. In Confucian ethics, the central concept for this principle of harmony – both in nature and in human society – as well as for the “Way of Right Action,” is dao (道, literally “the Way”). While the concept of dao in Chinese thought, particularly in Daoism, can also have a cosmic, metaphysical, and even mystical dimension – being seen as the primordial principle and source of all being, or the principle of natural order – in the ethical realm it stands for the universal principle that guides human life and moral decisions.
For Aristotle, as for Confucius, virtue stands at the center of the ethical ideal. He posits that the highest purpose of human life is Eudaimonia (εὐδαιμονία), a state best understood as “human flourishing” or “true happiness”. Eudaimonia does not mean a transient feeling of joy or pleasure, but rather the full realization of human potential achieved through a life of virtuous activity. For Aristotle, virtue (ἀρετή aretḗ) is a settled character trait that is expressed as a mean – the “golden mean” – between two extremes of deficiency and excess, for example courage as the perfect mean between the extremes of recklessness and cowardice. Because finding this balance requires judgment, virtue is intrinsically linked to reason. A virtuous person acts rationally by discerning the appropriate mean in every situation. Consequently, virtues are not innate but are learned habits, cultivated through consistent practice and thoughtful reflection.
An interesting point of comparison is their respective views on the relationship between the individual and society. While Confucius considers integration into social harmony to be fundamental, Aristotle does also emphasize that man is a social or “political animal” (zoon politikon ζῷον πολιτικόν), who by nature lives in a community and fulfills his purpose through social life, thereby realizing his virtue. Thus, both thinkers share a strong emphasis on the importance of community.
However, for Confucius, the focus on social harmony and the observance of rites and norms is more central and constitutive. He places greater weight on the individual’s embeddedness within a specific social and familial fabric. Aristotle’s ethics, by contrast, feature a seemingly stronger individualistic component, as the individual must use their own reason to attain virtue and, consequently, Eudaimonia.
Aristotle stands as one of the foundational sources for the emphasis on reason and rationality in later Western intellectual history. For him, reason (νοῦς nous) and the previously mentioned concept of Logos (λόγος) are central to human nature—they constitute the faculty for rational deliberation, logical argument, and understanding both oneself and the world. This faculty is essential for forming moral judgments and living an ethical life. Through the virtue of practical wisdom (φρόνησις phronesis), an individual can discern sound decisions, that is, the golden mean. By employing reason, one can avoid extreme, impulsive, and excessively passion-driven behaviors, and thereby choose the correct course of action.
This foundational focus on individual reason naturally leads to a strong emphasis on personal autonomy and responsibility. Aristotle posits that the individual is thus responsible for shaping their own life and making their own moral choices, a concept that can be viewed as a foundational element for individualism in the Western philosophical tradition. This Aristotelian seed of the rational, self-directed individual would find its full flowering in the European Enlightenment.
The idea that the individual attains moral excellence through reason and self-cultivation is indeed a central component of many later Western philosophical movements, particularly the Enlightenment. Seventeenth and eighteenth-century European philosophers such as Kant and Rousseau adopted this concept, viewing reason as a universal tool for achieving individual moral and intellectual excellence, as well as societal progress. As referenced earlier, Kant’s injunction to “dare to know” (sapere aude) was part of this tradition, and he went so far as to claim that the individual must establish their own moral principles through reason.
For Kant, an enlightened individual does not derive moral principles from external authorities or tradition, but is capable of self-legislation – determining the laws of their own actions. This process must be grounded not in subjective or arbitrary whim, but in rational deliberation, with the aim of formulating universal moral laws. This is the essence of his “categorical imperative”: to act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
Kant’s focus on self-legislation brings us to a central focus of modern and contemporary ethics: the act itself. In more recent Western ethical thought, the primary question has shifted away from the virtue and character of the person, and toward the actions performed and the principles guiding them. This marks a significant transition from virtue ethics to an ethics of duty, or deontology.
Thus, the circle is complete, returning our focus to freedom and democracy. The Enlightenment’s ethical framework champions the principle of moral equality, positing that every individual possesses equal moral worth and is endowed with the same fundamental rights and duties. It views individuals as rational beings capable of both determining and adhering to moral law, thereby enabling them to make equal and valuable contributions to the community. In this ideal, every person’s voice and influence should carry equal weight.
Closely linked to this is an emphasis on individual freedom from the exercise of illegitimate power by the state or other authorities. This encompasses the right of every individual to bodily and mental integrity. With these Enlightenment principles and modern democratic values now well integrated, this paves the way for the elaboration of my argument concerning positive and negative normative conceptions.
Freedom and democracy are “negative” normative conceptions in the sense that they remain open regarding the precise nature of the ethical good. They merely define the fundamental principles, rights, and freedoms that must be defended, but – by definition – do not prescribe which “positive” normative conception the individual should construct from within this framework. The modern world and modern ethics grant us the immense freedom to determine for ourselves what is good and right.
I do not mean to suggest that we should assign less importance to freedoms and rights. Rather, I argue that shared, positive normative conceptions are also desirable, if not necessary, for society as a whole. Without any shared vision of the good life and how to live together, a society or civilization seems to be missing something essential. This is perhaps the quintessential manifestation of the various moral souls in the West’s breast: a conflict between the foundational, negative liberty that protects the individual and a deep, unfulfilled yearning for a shared, positive moral substance.
Indeed, to restrict our collective prescriptive imagination solely to rights, freedoms, and individual autonomy is to leave a vast space empty – a space that could be filled with shared, value-enhancing ideals. This void is thus potentially ceded to voices and movements that may not have everyone’s best interests at heart. I have long felt that a vacuum exists in this regard within the contemporary West. A civilization cannot be built on liberalism alone.
In time, I came to understand that it was precisely this kind of ethical worldview and way of life that had fascinated me about East Asia. While in the West everything had to be considered equally valid (even if reality did not quite correspond to this ideology at all), in East Asia there seemed to be a clearer conception of what the good consists of. Not only did ideas and reality seem to be in greater harmony, but there also appeared to be a more pervasive sense of social cohesion. Whether this is or was truly the case, and for what reasons, can be reasonably doubted. And yet, I remain convinced that the West suffers a lack of compelling and active moral substance, and that this may be all too much to its distinct detriment.
On a philosophical level, “Western civilization” must find ways to contend with the problems of its own modernity. Yet whether the core problem is truly philosophical in nature remains an open question. It could well be that a more fruitful search for causes lies in the sphere of actual politics. However relevant the dimension of worldviews and ideas may be, the political fabric behind real lifeworlds is almost certainly more consequential, as it is more immediate. It is within this political sphere that we bear the responsibility to translate the ideals of freedom and democracy into practice. And it is here that the West’s contending moral souls still struggle to find a way to reconcile.
PRE-PUBLISHING HERE OVER THE COMING WEEKS
Excerpts from We and the West (and the World):
I. The West’s Emergence as a Historical Civilization
→ 1/11 The “West” Merely Relative? – Geographically Western Eurasia
→ 2/11 First Traces of the West 2500 Years Ago?
→ 3/11 Ancient Greece as a Key Reference – Not Only for the West
II. The West’s Trajectory toward Modernity
→ 4/11 Switzerland’s Emergence at the Heart of the West
→ 5/11 Western Expansion and Imperial Continuity
→ 6/11 The West in Modernity – The Measure of Almost All Things
III. The West as a Contemporary Entity
→ 7/11 The West in the Global Order
→ 8/11 Unipolar, Hegemonic, Transatlantic Biases
→ 9/11 Various Moral Souls in the West’s Breast
→ 10/11 Western Modes of Functioning – “Liberal” and “Democratic”?
→ 11/11 Barely Veiled Oligarchies? Truly Legitimate Social Order?
→ Bonus: Whither, Post-Unipolar West?